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Abstract
Validation of the Security of Participant Control Exchanges in Secure Multicast
Content Delivery
Mohammad Parham
In Content Delivery Networks (CDN), as the customer base increases, a point is reached
where the capacity of the network and the content server become inadequate. In extreme
cases (e.g., world class sporting events), it is impossible to adequately serve the clientele,
resulting in extreme customer frustration. In these circumstances, multicast content delivery
is an attractive alternative. However, the issue of maintaining control over the customers
is diﬃcult.
In addition to controlling the access to the network itself, in order to control the access of
users to the multicast session, an Authentication, Authorization and Accounting Framework
was added to the multicast architecture. A successful authentication of the end user is a
prerequisite for authorization and accounting. The Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) provides an authentication framework to implement authentication properly, for
which more than thirty diﬀerent available EAP methods exist.
While distinguishing the multicast content delivery requirements in terms of function-
ality and security, we will be able to choose a smaller set of relevant EAP methods ac-
cordingly. Given the importance of the role of the ultimate chosen EAP method, we will
precisely compare the most likely to be useful methods and eventually pick the Extensi-
ble Authentication Protocol - Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling (EAP-FAST)
framework as the most suitable one.
Based on the work on receiver participant controls, we present a validation of the security
of the exchanges that are required to ensure adequate control and revenue recovery.
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Content Delivery (for example, audio or video on demand) has become signiﬁcantly easier
in recent years. These applications have existed on broadcast media for a long time but
now they are adapted to the new medium, the Internet, which is widely distributed and
cheaply accessible. Upon a real time request of a client for such an application, content
streams get delivered over the Internet through a direct connection from a source to the
client. In order to justify the service, the client has to pay for the application he/she is
using. This implies that some form of electronic transaction (e-transaction) is needed. In
order to prevent fraud on payments, some form of security is needed too. So far, content
delivery applications, e-transactions and required security over the Internet are available
and work properly with a fairly large number of clients.
1.2 Scalability
As the number of clients grows, more data need to be produced and delivered to individual
clients. Therefore, load in the network (the transfer medium) as well as on the server (the
producer of the content) will grow. As this load grows, the number of patrons wanting
identical or near-to-identical service is increased.
1.3 Former Solution
In order to serve them all, the easiest solution could be adding more equipment on both the
server and transfer media. So that, the single server works as a group of farm computers
and is not only responsible for generating content streams for every individual client, but
1
also is responsible for keeping record of all of them for further ﬁnancial charging issues. On
the other hand, the transfer medium needs to manage to deliver the relatively larger content
to the clients. Although in such a case we are able to increase the number of clients without
a need to change the nature of the available tools and trust relationships, we have to pay a
lot for equipment and we will face a low income-to-expenses ratio. More importantly, still
we are restricted to capacity limitations on the transfer media.
1.4 Better Solution
Given the fact that we are considering that clients are asking for the same application, it
becomes feasible to look at the case as simultaneous distribution of a similar content to
many clients. In the extreme, we can provide a well-known soccer example. When millions
of fans want to watch a soccer match in real time over the Internet, they particularly ask
for the same thing simultaneously. However, still they face diﬃculties receiving a smooth
video and very often they receive discrete images with pixel distortion.
The aforementioned perspective of view (simultaneous distribution of a similar content
to many clients) is useful and results in a new architecture, which has two main beneﬁts:
reducing the network load and reducing the server load. However, the drawback is that
previously-established trust relationships are going to be gone and consequently so is the
cash.
In order to be revenue-productive again, we have to ﬁnd ways to introduce some new
form of trust relationships and propose them in new packages. In comparison with the ﬁrst
solution (adding more equipment), although a whole new set of trust relationships has to
be established, we can pay less for equipment, have an unlimited number of clients and
consequently a higher income. More importantly, we can save network resources as well as
available bandwidth.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The actual new trust relationships and the actors have been previously deﬁned [1] and a
framework for moving the required information around [2] has also already been designed.
From a top level perspective point of view, our thesis is written based on the knowledge
about these previous tasks to demonstrate the functionality and associated security in the
architecture. The contributions of our work will be: deﬁning the communications needed
to eﬀect these trust relationships; ensuring that paths implementing the trust relationships
are valid and secure; what the actors need to move around and how they have to do it in
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a secure way (since the security is essential for revenue generation to work properly); and
eventually validation of the security.
In order to have a better understanding of the architecture, we will discuss previous
work in the next two chapters and then in chapter 4 we will explicitly focus on the part of
the architecture that we wish to contribute to. In chapter 5 we will propose our solution.
The validation of the solution by means of a formal validation tool called AVISPA is in





Delivery of streaming data to individual users has been a challenging problem for many
years. Scientists and engineers have tried to propose successful solutions with a proven
reliability to show the feasibility of content delivery. One of the well-known solutions is
called unicast technology, through which data is transmitted to all the destinations that are
connected directly and separately to a single server. The unicast architecture has worked
eﬃciently in various media. It has been used in the Internet to deliver data streams to
individual users. This architecture establishes a one-to-one connection between a source
and a user as the only two actors. In the architecture they are called the server and the
client. The architecture provides protocols and rules for data transmission between them.
2.2 E-commerce and Trust Relationships
E-commerce models have been designed already to resolve the problem of taking money over
the Internet. They have been designed to work well with the components of the unicast
architecture too. Over the years, both the unicast architecture and e-commerce models
have been developed gradually and worked well together to transfer the streaming data and
make money.
Whenever two parties want to exchange data between themselves, they need to establish
some sort of trust relationship. Whether the exchanged data is free or not, real time or
not, requires credential or not; the trust relationship has to be established between the
two parties to ﬁrst, ﬁnd each other and then to make sure that on the other side of the
communication line there exists the intended party not somebody else.
If one party is a sender and the other party is a receiver, they still need to mutually
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authenticate each other. The receiver needs to believe that the sender is the actual sender
(so that he can expect to receive valid content) and the sender needs to believe that the
receiver is the real receiver. That is establishing the trust relationship.
In the speciﬁc case, when a client wants to ask for an application over the Internet,
the unicast architecture, e-commerce models and established trust relationships among the
actors are necessary. In fact, these trust relationships are naturally added (between the two
actors) because if two persons want to negotiate with each other, ﬁrst they must trust each
other and then establish a connection. So far content delivery to individual users is done
successfully. It is worth to note that also an acceptable level of security has been added to
the procedures to prevent fraud and to prevent free access of non-paying users. Although
the trust relationships are, as they called, trustful to transfer data between the actors, the
path on which data ﬂows needs to be kept secure too. This additional security, unicast
architecture and e-commerce models developed over the time and work well together.
2.3 Multicast Distribution Technology
Inherently, a content producer wishes to increase the number of its clients without any
restrictions. In a one-to-one environment, using unicast transmission, established trust
relationships and e-commerce models for ﬁnancial purposes, all of which have to be managed,
are not suﬃcient to comply with the producer’s wishes. In fact, in one-to-one transmissions,
once trust relationships are established, the source machine is assigned some tasks and
responsibilities regarding individual users. Typically, the source machine has two kinds of
tasks. Not only does it have to produce data for each individual user and put the data
on the transfer media, but also it has to manage each user’s session. Session management
is needed to deliver the right content at the right time to the user and eventually charge
him properly. That is why, if the number of users increases beyond a certain limit, very
likely the source machine (sender) will become overloaded and unable to respond properly
to requests since the processing requirements of managing the unicast transmissions and
e-commerce transactions increases proportionately.
As the number of customers increases, while it is possible to divide the load conceptually
into the unicast data delivery load (to be done by a central content server) and the trust
management and e-commerce relation load (to be assigned to a content provider), processing
requirements still grow directly with the number of customers. Although delivery load and
session management load are two separate concepts, they are still growing similarly and
eventually, as the number of customers increases, one or both of the subsystems will fail.
In real time applications based on separate one-to-one relationships between a single
5
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Figure 1: Unicast vs. Multicast
server and all of the paying clients, in fact, when the number of users increases enormously
over one speciﬁc service being generated by a single server, it is not possible to serve all of
them simultaneously due to the two following restrictions:
• Processing limits of the single source machine
• Bandwidth limitations
That is why decreasing the processing needs of the single server and also decreasing the
bandwidth needs of the network operators are two important problems to be solved.
A speciﬁc form of group data delivery, known as Multicasting [3] (see ﬁgure 1), was
introduced many years ago. In its original mode, it allows multiple senders and multiple
receivers. This is a method of simultaneous data delivery to a group of destinations in
one transmission attempt from one or more sender(s). It was initially set up in terms of
“anybody can send, anybody can receive”.
In a video on-demand environment, as the size of the group grows, the likelihood of
several receivers wanting identical or near-to-identical service grows up. As specialists began
to realize the overload characteristics of unicast data delivery, they found that receivers are
likely to form a group since they all receive the same service. This approach was the
beginning of the idea to think how to use multicast to solve the scalability problem in
unicast (see sections 1.2 and 1.3). In fact, the multicast architecture is very useful in the
delivery technology. It responds to the need of a scalable delivery technology for a fairly
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large number of paying clients (who want identical service) without the need for a prior
knowledge of who or how many clients there are.
Unlike the unicast architecture where a sender is responsible for sending data streams
to individual users and managing their sessions one-by-one, multicast uses network infras-
tructures eﬃciently by only requiring the source to send a packet once, even if it needs to be
delivered to a large number of receivers. The nodes in the network take care of replicating
the packet only when it is needed to reach multiple receivers. Also some of the network
components participate in session management for individual users.
2.3.1 Multicast Scalability
The use of multicast in content delivery reduces the processing needs of the server (for
both producing the content and managing individual sessions of each user) as well as the
bandwidth needs of the network operators. As the result, the multicast architecture solves
the scalability problem we faced in the unicast case. The server does not have to produce
data packets for each end user. It just produces one packet and sends it out. The packet
is then duplicated by the network routers whenever it is needed. So, on the routing tree,
the bandwidth is not wasted either. Moreover, the source is not aware of all the individual
users’ session information any more. The end users are managed in a diﬀerent way by new
participants in the multicast distribution technology.
2.3.2 Multicast Generality
Despite the similarity between pay-per-view structures and multicast content delivery ‘to
send an identical data stream to a large group of clients in one transmission attempt’, in
pay-per-view structures, service provider is a private provider and delivery media belongs
entirely to that service provider. Also, clients must chose their favorite service among a set
of possible services, which is already speciﬁed by the company. In contrast, in multicast
content delivery, generality plays a signiﬁcant role to give the chance to clients to chose
whatever they want in a wide variety of possible data streams and use Internet as the
publicly-accessible medium.
2.3.3 Multicast Actors
Although the multicast distribution technology scales for unlimited number of end users,
the previously existing trust relationships between the unicast architecture and e-commerce
models are gone in the new technology. There is not a single server to produce all data














Figure 2: Multicast architecture
architecture, with new responsibilities and roles. In contrast to the unicast architecture in
which trust relationships are mainly added across the two actors (the client and the server),
a new whole set of more collaborative trust relationships have been deﬁned in the multicast
architecture [1] to be distributed among the new participants.
We divide the multicast trust relationships and the actors into primary (those on which
we will focus in this thesis) and secondary.
Considering trust relationships in multicast area, video on schedule is an example here
(as opposed to video on demand in unicast area). There are primary actors (End User,
Network Service Provider and Merchant) participating the multicast procedures. These
primary actors are cooperating at the same level. See ﬁgure 2.
The End User (EU) is the actual customer who needs to ﬁnd a marketer and advertiser
on the web to show him his interest in receiving a speciﬁc multicast content at the agreed-
upon time. The EU is also being asked to prove his ability to pay. Once he provides valid
credentials he will be issued a permission to order his favorite multicast service later on.
Upon presenting his valid ticket to the closest network-side machine the EU should receive
multicast data.
The Merchant is actually a web based participant who introduces and advertises the
service to the public. It should be easily accessible for customers so that they can visit him
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anytime and anywhere in the Internet to choose a service. He is responsible for receiving
the order from potential EUs, checking their ability to pay through trusted communications
with ﬁnancial institutions and issuing the end users a permission ticket to allow them to
join a multicast session in the future.
The Network Service Provider makes use of its internal components for delivery
and charging issues as well as authentication and authorization of end users. It receives
multicast data from the source and once the end user presents his permission ticket to the
NSP, it delivers the multicast data to authenticated and authorized end users. The NSP
creates an account for each individual end user at the network edge for further accounting
purposes.
In addition, there are secondary actors (Financial Institution and Content Server/Content
Provider), which are out of scope in this thesis document.
• CS: Content Server is the actual producer of physical data stream. It is managed by
a Content Provider.
• CP: Content Provider is the provider of server-side policies who communicates with
the Merchant (MR) and the Network Service Provider (NSP) to issue basic policies
and distribute them to all the actors.
• FI: Financial Institution is an outsider ﬁnancial participant (e.g. a bank, a credit
grantor, etc.) who has secure and trusted connections with the MR. The ﬁnancial
institution approves or disapproves the MR’s request regarding the individual end
user’s ability to pay. Once the FI approves the ability to pay for a speciﬁc end user,
the MR becomes assured that the end user can be charged at the end of the session
for his consumed resources. That is, the FI will be responsible for eventually taking
money from the user on the MR’s behalf.
2.3.4 Multicast vs. Kerberos
Kerberos [4, 5] is an authentication protocol which similar to secure multicast authenticates
nodes on the basis of tickets to allow them identifying each other in a secure manner
for further communications. Although mutual authentication is another similarity and
Kerberos messages are protected against spooﬁng and replay attack, Kerberos is built on
symmetric key cryptography and requires a trusted third party while in secure multicast
neither the MR plays as a trusted third party between the EU and the NSP, nor the AR
plays that role between the EU and the EAPS. The need for a trusted third party in
9
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Figure 3: Server-side pre-negotiations
Kerberos protocol increases the overhead and decreases eﬃciency of the protocol in large
scale systems.
Moreover, Kerberos user uses a long-term shared secret as the authentication ticket to
receive another ticket (Ticket Granting Ticket) from the authentication server. The user
can (re)use the TGT to get additional tickets without resorting to using the shared secret.
The TGT is used to receive service from the server. In secure multicast, authentication
of the EU is done in the same place as authorization and accounting and they are not
separated jobs. Since everybody with acceptable ﬁnancial proof is potentially able to ask to
join a multicast session and receive a ticket, there is no need to separate the authentication
and authorization to be done in diﬀerent places and consequently adding more security
steps in between. In Kerberos, for each level of authentication or authorization, there is
a need to issue a ticket. In contrast, in secure multicast, once a fresh secret is generated
and exchanged, both parties have the option of further secure exchange as much as needed
without an extra overhead.
Kerberos has been recently updated [6] but still the main structure is kept the same.
2.3.5 Multicast Trust Relationships
There are some required oﬄine pre-negotiations among network-side participants to be able
to deﬁne later policies and connection rules based on these pre-negotiations (see ﬁgure 3).
As we explained roles and responsibilities of each of the actors (in section 2.3.3), there
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were indications of trust relationships among them too. Trust relationships are added
to the multicast architecture to facilitate “on schedule” content delivery. Although they
vary in nature and actors, they work cooperatively and closely. Considering on schedule
content delivery, there are six diﬀerent trust relationships (see ﬁgure 4) in this part of the
architecture brieﬂy as follows:
1. The CP distributes multicast policies to the MR and the NSP for pre-negotiation
purposes.
2. The EU communicates with the MR to submit his request and the MR responds to
his request.
3. The MR and the FI have established trust relationships between themselves, through







Figure 4: Multicast trust relationships
4. Once the EU receives a valid ticket showing his permission from the MR he presents
the ticket (including proper information) to the NSP to receive multicast data.
5. The NSP, on the other side, has communication with the CP/CS to receive multicast
data from the source. Clearly, trust relationships are established between them as
well.
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6. Finally, the NSP and the MR communicate for ﬁnal charging issues of end users. It
is needed since only the MR has direct negotiations with the FI and accounting is
done mainly by the NSP components while generally the FI is responsible for actual
charging of the EU. So, the NSP communicates with the MR to bridge the accounting
steps to the ﬁnal charging.
As seen so far, unlike the unicast case where only the two actors participate in the
whole purchasing and delivery mechanisms, in the multicast case, at least six actors must
perform their tasks to ﬁnalize purchasing, delivery and charging issues. These actors are
located in diﬀerent places and each one is assigned one or more task(s). These tasks, on the
one hand, are distinct tasks since they are done by diﬀerent actors in diﬀerent places and
times; and on the other hand, they are collaborative tasks since they are associated with
individual users. That is why a piece of written information, so-called token, is needed
to move around between the actors to make their communications feasible. The token is a
piece of information basically as a ticket to enter to a multicast session. The token originally
is issued by a MR and given to an End User. The end user uses his token to connect to
a multicast session. It includes various information in order to mainly validate the MR’s
legitimacy and the EU’s identity.
2.4 IP Multicast Architecture and Policy Framework
Although the classical model of multicast had not been widely deployed due to lack of ac-
cess control over the sender and receiver, the IP multicast, as the developed technology,
potentially can be in use since an accountable, distributed and secure architecture for mul-
ticasting has been designed by Atwood [1]. Also, a ﬂexible, scalable and easily adaptable
policy framework for multicast group control has been proposed by Islam and Atwood [7],
which fully complies with the multicast secure framework.
2.5 Authentication, Authorization and Accounting Function-
alities
The multicast distribution technology will be useful only if it makes revenue from pur-
chasers and prevents non-purchasers from taking free advantage of the service. Reviewing
the requirements for that reason, the multicast stream must be secured. There are two
orthogonal criteria to be satisﬁed for securing multicast communications and as a result
making revenue: managing the access to a multicast session (access control) and protecting
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multicast data (data control) by applying encryption and deploying secure transmission
methods. For secure data transmission, the Multicast Group Security Architecture [8] has
been developed by the Multicast Security (msec) Working Group of the IETF. The key to
manage the access to a multicast session and generate revenue from purchasers lies on three
main issues:
• Validate the end user’s identity as a potentially-paying customer to join
• Deﬁne his/her rights in using the multicast data
• Check the potential end user’s ability to pay and eventually charge him/her after the
multicast data delivery
The three functionalities have to be executed in order. An end user who has already
proved his ability to pay has to be identiﬁed ﬁrst by the session managers once he submits
his request to an AR to receive multicast data. Then, the NSP components authorize
the EU, give him his rights and specify the agreed-upon type and time of the multicast
service he has already ordered. Consequently, a successful authentication is a prerequisite
for authorization. An authenticated and authorized end user is now eligible to receive
multicast data. While the EU is receiving the multicast content, NSP components count
the multicast delivered bytes of data and keep records of each EU at the NAS databases
for accounting and charging purposes.
This implies that there has to be strong relationships to authentication, authorization
and accounting of the end users. For this purpose, we can use Authentication, Authoriza-
tion, and Accounting (AAA) [9] Protocols, which were originally designed to manage the
access to the network as a whole.
2.5.1 AAA Framework in Unicast Model
In unicast models, the authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) protocols [9]
are being used successfully to make revenue by controlling the access to network resources.
Similar to controlling the access to the network itself, AAA protocols potentially can be used
for multicast based applications to authenticate end users, to establish end user’s authority
in the multicast group and to keep a record of their group activities for charging issues prior
to deliver any service to clients. The key point to ensure revenue generation from multicast
clients lies on these three consequent steps. This implies that there has to be a strong trust
relationship between AAA protocols along with e-commerce interactions.
In unicast, AAA framework has two components: the AAA Server and the AAA Client.









Figure 5: AAA framework in unicast
Access Server (NAS) works as the entry point into the network and contains a AAA client.
The NAS collects authentication data of an end user and sends them to the AAA Server.
Then, the AAA Server, based on its repository information returns an “accept” or “reject”
response to the AAA Client.
The aforementioned AAA framework in unicast could be the simplest similar example for
the use of AAA functionality in multicast where a successful authentication is a prerequisite
for authorization. For example, in a secure multicast group, only a few members might have
the rights to both send and receive multicast data and the rest of the members can join as
a receiver only and are not permitted to send any multicast data.
2.5.2 AAA Framework in Multicast Distribution
Similar to managing the access to the network as a whole, which is up until now successfully
done by AAA Protocols, Islam and Atwood [2] have proposed a AAA framework to control
the access to a (multicast) session. Within this framework, AAA protocols are reﬁned to be
used for multicast based applications and individual sessions to authenticate the end users,
to establish their authority to participate in the multicast session and to keep a record of
their session activities.
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Within this framework, once the end user informs the nearest access router of his interest
in receiving multicast content, the access router performs the AAA client behaviors on behalf
of the Content Provider. A ﬂexible Policy Framework by Islam and Atwood [7] is proposed
where the Group Owner (GO) is able to specify multicast policies that will be enforced at
the access router.
2.6 Multicast Compatibility
Secure IP multicast is not tied to a particular IP version. Although IPv4 terminology
is used in protocol descriptions and deﬁnitions, secure multicast content delivery is still
applicable to IPv6. The architecture is independent of multicast routing protocols too.
Therefore, there are no restrictions to expand the architecture for future improvements in
later versions of Internet protocols.
2.7 Secure IP Multicast with Double-sided Access Control
Unlike regular shared media where “everyone can send; everyone can receive”, in the secure
multicast technology “only legitimate senders can send; only valid customers can receive”.
This is the result of the double-sided access control policy. It is basically composed of a
sender access control [10] to implement the ﬁrst rule (only legitimate senders can send)
and a receiver access control [11] to implement the second one (only valid customers can
receive). However, in insecure classical architecture of IP multicast “everyone can send;
only valid customers can receive” due to lack of sender access control [10]. That is, the
insecure classical architecture of IP multicast, allows any user to send data to a multicast
group without a prior join to that group. Consequently, an attacker can take advantage of
this shortcoming, weaken the usage of the network and waste the bandwidth by sending
many bogus packets to a group. Obviously, data encryption techniques will not solve the
problem either.
That is why access control is applied to both the sender and the receiver in the secure
multicast architecture. But the sender access control is out of scope in this thesis and
whenever we say access control, we mean the receiver (end user) access control. We believe
that the receiver access control can guarantee making revenue. It protects the access to the
multicast session. Through the receiver access control [11], paying customers are identiﬁed
to use the session and are authorized to access their rights. Moreover, non-paying users are
prohibited from taking advantage of free multicast service.
15
2.8 NSP in detail
IP multicasting as a content delivery architecture provides its service by means of its com-
ponents, such as the Network Server Provider(s) over the Internet. The NSPs are working
as the heart of the architecture since they provide multicast packet delivery as well as the
structure for Authentication, Authorization and Accounting of end users. The NSP includes
various participants, who are necessary actors playing signiﬁcant roles in the architecture.
Since the Extensible Authentication Protocol [12] is used for authentication purposes, the
EAP Servers (EAPS) interpret the content of the token. Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting Server (AAAS), Network Access Servers (NAS), Access Routers (AC) and
Core Routers (CR) are the other participants in the NSP.
• AR: Access Routers are the closest network routers to end users (as well as to CP/CS).
They serve the network link to which a sender (CP/CS) or a receiver (EU) is con-
nected. Access Routers are also in a position to gather necessary information and
create a data structure regarding all the individual users who are directly connected
to them for further accounting purposes.
• NAS: Network Access Servers are associated with each Access Router. They keep
records of the end users and maintain data structures of the access router while main
task of the access routers is routing and ﬁnalizing data delivery.
• EAPS: An Extensible Authentication Protocol Server uses previously-provided poli-
cies (by the CP or the MR) to issue authentication of an end user who has sent
his/her request to the AR to join the multicast session in advance. The EAPS ﬁrst
interprets the content of the token, which is in turn wrapped within the payload of
an EAP method. Upon a successful authentication as the ﬁrst completed A in AAA
procedures, the EAP method is going to command the access router to execute the
join request and deliver multicast data to the end user based on the end user’s autho-
rization. The EAP method also makes sure that the third A happens by commanding
the AR to count the bytes (or whatever other accounting statistic it is commanded
to accumulate).
• AAAS: An Authentication, Authorization and Accounting Server is associated with
EAPS and is used to serve the carrier of the EAP packet through AAA protocols from
the AR (NAS) to the EAPS.
• CR: Core Routers are the interior nodes of the transfer media and performs the task





3.1 Introduction and Components
In the sense that the concept of AAA protocols has a sub-concept of authentication, identity
information of the EU has to be transferred from the AAA peer (the EU) to an AAA
Server (or its proxy in the NAS). The fact that the EU and the NAS talk to each other
for authentication purposes, is done in some authentication protocols. The Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [12] deﬁnes an authentication framework, which typically
runs directly over data link layers and has three components: the EAP peer, the EAP
authenticator and the EAP Server. In multicast content delivery, the three components
of the EAP map onto the EU host, the AR (co-located with a NAS) and the “backend









Figure 6: EAP components are mapped to the EU, AR and AAAS
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3.2 Authentication in EAP
The EAP was originally designed for use in network access authentication but in the secure
IP multicast technology it is used for the multicast session access authentication. The EAP
protocol can support diﬀerent multicast authentication mechanisms. In order to simplify
credential management and authentication decision making regarding individual users, the
AR acts as a pass-through agent for the back-end authentication server and does not collect
any credential information about End Users.
3.3 EAP Methods
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), in addition to the authentication as a func-
tional feature, has security considerations to protect the multicast content delivery against
potential attacks and threats. Typically, the base EAP provides negotiation between the
EAP peer and the EAP back-end authentication server to chose an EAP method, through
which they will exchange data. Currently, there exist more than thirty diﬀerent EAP meth-
ods as the IETF standards. In fact, one of the main diﬀerences among various available
EAP methods is the way that they protect the exchange of information during and after
the authentication procedures. Although the structure of the multicast design [1] and par-
ticipants (see section: 2.3.3) dictates some restrictions on picking the right EAP method
that matches the design, the more secure the EAP method that we choose, the more conﬁ-
dence we will have in the security of exchanges. Among more than thirty diﬀerent possible
EAP methods (see section 5.4.2), several of them in some manner satisfy our functionality
requirements. However, we have a particular set of security requirements (see section 5.4.4)
for which to satisfy we need to precisely analyze the most likely useful EAP methods and
pick the right one. In this thesis, we have analyzed relevant EAP methods and chosen
EAP-FAST [13] as the most appropriate one. We will show how EAP-FAST best suits our
design and satisﬁes our security requirements in addition to functionality requirements.
There is a variety of diﬀerent EAP methods. The EU and the NAS agree to chose
one. The chosen EAP method then authenticates the EU and dictates authorization and
accounting rules according to its payload information, which in fact is the token’s content.
3.4 EAP Carriers
The host of the EU places the token in the EAP payload and the EAP method runs
directly over the data link layer while the multicast session join request includes network
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layer information. In order to move the EAP packets from the EU to the NAS, Islam
and Atwood [14] have proposed a mechanism, Internet Group Management Protocol with
Access Control (IGMP-AC), to link the EAP level request to the network level request. The
IGMP-AC performs access control of the end users (only if required for a speciﬁc session)
and has the capability of carrying EAP packets from the EU to the NAS in addition to the
IGMPv3 [15] functionalities. Moreover, EAP packets have to eventually reach the EAPS for
interpretation. In fact, it is eﬃciently possible to move them through AAA protocols (e.g.,
Diameter [16]) from the NAS to the EAPS. As a result, an Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting Server (AAAS) is required to be located with the EAPS. The AAA Server





In this chapter, we attempt to emphasize on the multicast architecture, starting from an
overall point of view and reaching to the speciﬁc point that we wish to talk about later on
as this thesis contribution. Then, we will mention shortages of previously discussed tools
in the multicast architecture (as basic aspects of our thesis problem) in terms of security
and functionality. Our goals here are the problem deﬁnition and focusing to the point in
multicast architecture in which our deﬁned problem resides.
4.2 Multicast Privilege
The multicast distribution technology solves the scalability problem of unicast frameworks
to serve unlimited number of end users for one speciﬁc service generated by a single server.
The multicast architecture reduces the processing needs of the server machine as well as
bandwidth requirements of the transfer media.
In the architecture for secure and accountable multicast proposed by Atwood [1], the
CS/CP load is reduced signiﬁcantly since the pair do not have to keep record of individual
users any more and do not have to produce data for each end user either. In the multicast
architecture, the CS is required to produce only one packet for all the customers and ob-
viously, the packet has to be duplicated by other network components (when needed) and
sent to lower stream components all the way down to eventually reach all EUs in real time.
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4.3 Multicast Overview
In addition to deﬁning new participants (see section 2.3.3), the multicast architecture takes
advantage of network operators and components for routing. That is, the responsibility
for routing is distributed over the network. The architecture prevents customers from
connecting directly to the source machine and instead, requires them to establish primary
trust relationships to:
1. Visit a Merchant (MR) to choose their favorite multicast service and order it.
2. Request from a Network Service Provider (NSP) to connect to the network and join
the multicast session.
Upon a successful authentication, which is an exchange of a set of EAP messages, the
authenticator decides to allow access to a multicast session to the peer; and the peer, who
already has the permission to receive this access, joins the multicast session and receives his
favorite multicast data. The EAP method is going to (as a side-eﬀect of the agreeing request)
command the AR to execute the join request and deliver multicast data. The EAP method
also makes sure that the third A in AAA steps, accounting, happens by commanding the
AR to count the amount of delivered data and record the required accounting information in
the EU’s data structure, which is already created by the NAS at the time of authentication.
Despite the unicast case, “purchasing” and “delivery” in multicast are separate pro-
cedures. They take place in diﬀerent locations and CP is diﬀerent from MR. However,
one-to-one connections and unicast communications are still applicable between each two
actors. Here, diﬀeences between the unicast case and multicast case are:
1. In multicast, purchasing (time) is distributed over time. Since we can add MRs to the
architecture as much as needed and clients can order their favorite service anytime,
MR interactions are small.
2. In multicast, delivery (time) is very focused in time while streaming data would be a
heavy duty in case of an individual connection between each EU and the CP. That is
why the architecture is designed to reduce the network load as well as the CP load.
When a multicast packet (destined to all the EUs) is generated by the CS, the packet is
being routed within the network to reach the intended EUs. Subsequently, a dynamic Data
Distribution Tree will be built to facilitate data delivery. The DDT will grow up while
new end users join the multicast session. In the DDT, the root is the single server and the
leaves are end users. Network components are responsible for building this tree. Since the
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DDT is a minimal-cost tree, practically the multicast architecture reduces the bandwidth
requirements of the transfer media too.
End User
Merchant
“Issuer of the Token”
Token
Access Router
“Forwarder of the Token”
EAP Server




Figure 7: Token in use
4.4 AAA Framework for Multicast
Following the multicast architecture [1], Islam and Atwood have proposed a policy frame-
work for multicast [7] and a framework to add AAA functionalities [2], which demonstrates
a whole new set of trust relationships that are deﬁned in the multicast architecture to be
distributed over various actors. Two primary trust relationships per EU and many EUs per
multicast session exist (see ﬁgure 7). Clearly, the result of the EU’s ﬁrst trust relationship
is going to be used in his second trust relationship and although they are done in diﬀerent
places, they have the same origin and basically apply to one end user. Therefore, not only
these two primary trust relationships are collaborative, but also other aforementioned trust
relationships (see section 2.3.5) in multicast architecture are collaborative. That is why
in order to facilitate communication of the distributed actors of these trust relationships
a piece of information so-called “token” must be handed in by each EU. The token has
to be issued by the right actor (a valid Merchant) and has to include proper information
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about the EU and his favorite multicast service. The token is then given to the EU and
the EU presents it to the system once he wants to connect to the network and a multicast
session. The token moves around in the system among distributed actors to track each EU’s
aﬀairs while no direct and real-time communication between network-side parties regarding
individual end users exists.
The token contains application layer information and is placed into an EAP packet
(see ﬁgure 8) over the data link layer. For Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
purposes, the packet has to move from the EU to an EAP Server. The AR (co-located with
the NAS) forwards the packet as the EAP authenticator to the EAP Server. The EAP
packet is carried through IGMP-AC [14] framework between the EU and NAS (as shown
in ﬁgure 8). The IGMP-AC is the developed version of the IGMPv3 [15] that enables
communications of a network level request with a data link layer request. The EAP packet
is then carried through AAA protocols (e.g., Diameter [16]) between the NAS and the EAP
Server. Clearly, a AAA Server must be co-located with the EAP Server to receive the









Figure 8: Token and its carriers
In order to control the receiver’s access to secure multicast group communication Sul-
tana and Atwood [17] have proposed an architecture to identify multicast end users. The
AAA architecture [9] of the IETF is incorporated in the solution. The end user information
in the system plays an important role for an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to control the
distribution of the multicast traﬃc as well as to collect real time user accounting informa-
tion. Islam and Atwood have extended these ideas [14] by using an EAP method to carry
the user information and achieve authentication. Moreover, authorization and accounting
information is included in the token to have Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
(AAA) functionality for each end user.
But so far, no proposal for the content of the token has been made. Given the facts that
the AAA functionalities are in tight relationships to the receiver access control protocols
and moreover, the EAP method, the token and the carrier protocols play major roles in
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the authentication, authorization and accounting of end users, we will try to propose a
framework to couple these relationships and move toward functionality of the secure IP
multicast architecture.
4.5 Shortages and Problem Deﬁnition
This thesis is not directly about security. However, it is tied to and based on many security
aspects [18, 19], according to which we wish to propose our solutions and ideas to be
able to eventually collect money. Therefore, in addition to functionality features that we
wish to add to the architecture, we have to add security features too. Moving the token
around through unsecured paths will end up in serious frauds. It will prevent the multicast
administrators from making revenue. Therefore, the path of the token has to be determined
securely.
The architecture can potentially be a target for critical attacks. Man-in-the-Middle
attack is likely to happen where EAP is tunneled within another protocol that omits mutual
authentication of the receiver and the sender.Also, EAP packets may suﬀer from spooﬁng,
replay attacks and modiﬁcation attacks. Dictionary attack is another common attack among
authentication mechanisms. Connection to an entrusted authenticator is a threat for the
end users if not they are not protected securely. We will explain well-known and likely-
to-happen threats and attacks and address security features of our proposed framework to
prevent them.
Although in order to show the feasibility of the whole architecture, Islam and At-
wood [11] have showed that the EAP-IKEv2 as a potential EAP method works fairly se-
curely, we will discuss about the security and functionality advantages of the EAP-FAST
over EAP-IKEv2 and other EAP methods. We believe that the chosen EAP method and
a secure tunnel as a path for the token transmission play the most important roles in pro-
tecting the on-schedule multicast content delivery from various vulnerabilities. We will




Participant Control Exchanges in
Secure Multicast Content Delivery
5.1 General Scenarios
In secure IP multicast content delivery several diﬀerent scenarios are likely to happen. They
might diﬀer on type of the multicast service, method and policy of charging the end user,
given information to and taken information from the end user, interactions of the FI and
MR and the steps of ﬁnalizing the accounting by the NSP. The EU might be interested
in entertainment, news, distance learning or live audio/video content. He might choose to
pay by credit card, personal checks, money order, certiﬁed checks or pay pal services. The
EU might be charged in advance, every hour/day/session or at the end of the multicast
delivery. According to these detailed diﬀerences, our solution covers a general scenario and
is ﬂexible towards future developments.
5.2 Token
5.2.1 Token in multicast content delivery
In secure IP multicast technology, diﬀerent actors of the multicast content delivery are
geographically scattered in a wide area. While no real-time negotiation exists among the
actors, they need to communicate with each other to perform diﬀerent tasks particularly
such as pursuing the client’s authentication, authorization and accounting. In order to
facilitate the communication of diﬀerent actors, a token [20] is in use and contains AAA
information. The token as an application layer piece of information is placed into an EAP
packet. The EAP packet in turn is carried using the IGMP-AC [14] framework from the
25
EU host to the AR and then using the Diameter [16] framework from the AR to the EAPS,
which is co-located with the AAAS.
The token is tightly coupled to its immediate carrier, the EAP method, in two main
ways.
Functionality
In one hand, the main task of the token is to facilitate the implementation of the authenti-
cation, authorization and accounting [9] functionalities. On the other hand, the EAP [12] as
an authentication framework has the sub-concept of authentication on its own. Therefore,
in addition to carrying the token in the payload, the EAP method basically performs the
authentication step and uses the content of the token for that purpose.
Security
The security of the multicast content delivery [18] is composed of network security and
data security. While the token itself has its own security features to provide data security,
the carrier of the token and the communication path must provide network security in the
architecture. For that reason, since the EAP method carries the token, it needs to have
security considerations and preferably establish a secure communication path from the EU
to the EAPS.
5.2.2 General Content of the Token
Some privacy surveys show consistently that eighty to ninety percent of all people are
concerning about privacy and less than ten percent of online customers would be willing to
exchange personal information. Therefore, in order to prove ﬁnancial ability of a multicast
client to pay, he is asked (by the MR) to provide only his ordinary credentials. Once the
client is guaranteed by the FI, the MR collects identity information of the client and adds
authentication clues to the token. Since the token would be placed in an EAP-FAST payload
later on, the MR puts EAP-FAST identiﬁers into the token at this moment. The MR then
asks the EU to clarify the features of the multicast service that he is interested in and adds
them to the token too. This information must show the following features of the multicast
service: Speciﬁc content server that produces the content, type of the service, duration of
the delivery (start and end time) and number of bytes of the data stream. Authorization
of the token will be done according to this part of the token’s content. It speciﬁes the
multicast service in detail and the rights of the EU to receive it. The MR has to include
accounting policy of the EU into the token’s content too. The accounting policy is enforced
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based on the MR-FI interactions and speciﬁes the instructions for the NSP to rule the AR









Interest: Specific multicast CS
Type of the multicast service
Identity: Digital certificate
Rights: Duration of the multicast delivery
Number of bytes to be delivered
Credential: Financial ability
Accounting policy
Figure 9: Token in general
Considering various authorization and accounting scenarios, the MR may either inform
the NSP to include the new EU along with his authorization and accounting instructions in
its list of potential end users or just add pre-negotiated authorization and accounting infor-
mation to the token. In the second case which is more likely to happen, pre-negotiations (see
section 2.3.5) had to be done among the MR and the NSP to facilitate the authorization
and accounting procedures in future. These pre-negotiations include enforcing and agreeing
on some policies. The MR and the NSP may create and exchange accounting and service
tables for that reasons.
Since the token needs to give the network operators enough routing addresses to be
routed from the AR towards a proper EAPS, the MR has to include routing information
(e.g., an IP address or a domain name) in the token. Moreover, although the AR does not
want to know the legitimacy of the issuer of the token (which the EU has presented), the
MR adds a digital signature to the token to show the EAPS that the token has been issued
by a valid MR.
27
5.3 Trust Relationships and Authentication
Whenever two distinguished parties want to communicate with each other and in a special
case, transfer some important data, they have to ﬁrst establish a trust relationship between
themselves. Each one needs to ensure that s/he actually talks to the intended party, not
somebody else. In multicast content delivery, authentication plays a signiﬁcant role in
mutual veriﬁcation of the identity of the sender and the receiver to establish the required
trust relationship. The sender wants to make sure that the receiver is a legitimate user with
a proven ﬁnancial ability to pay and the receiver wants to ensure that he is going to provide
his credentials to the trustful sender and receive the ordered-upon multicast content.
Since EUs (as legitimate receivers) are prohibited from visiting directly the Content
Provider (CP) (as the trustful sender) and subsequently there is no trust relationship be-
tween the EU and the CP, the EAP server works on behalf of the CP and there is a need
to establish EU—NSP trust relationships. The EAP framework is added to the design to
observe those trust relationships and to implement mutual authentication of the EU and
the CP. As shown in Figure 6 (section 3.1), the two main components of EAP, the EAP peer
and the EAP back-end authentication server, correspond to the EU and the EAP Server in
the multicast architecture. The Access Router (AR), who works as the forwarder of EAP
messages, represents the authenticator when it works in a pass-through mode.
5.4 EAP and Multicast Delivery Requirements
Generally, a successful authentication in multicast is an exchange of EAP messages, as a
result of which the EAP Server on behalf of the CP decides to grant the access to the EU to
join the multicast session. In point of fact, in the multicast architecture, the EAP Server’s
decision typically involves not only authentication, but also authorization and accounting
aspects. In order to prevent fraud on the revenue generation, security aspects must be
added to the design as well. Choosing the appropriate EAP method is not feasible unless
otherwise we determine the intended features of the design.
Therefore, we need to clearly understand functional and security requirements of the
multicast content delivery to be able to choose the right EAP method that corresponds to
the requirements properly and also to be able to justify the advantages of that EAP method
over other EAP methods.
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5.4.1 Common Features of the Intended EAP Method
In general, EAP is an authentication framework that provides some common functions and
features of EAP methods. In the literature, about forty diﬀerent EAP methods are in
wide use. There are many EAP methods deﬁned by RFCs and a number of vendor speciﬁc
methods exist too. Although they are all deﬁned to perform authentication successfully,
not necessarily all of them are useful in the multicast content delivery. According to the
structure and requirements of the multicast content delivery technology brieﬂy explained in
previous sections, ﬁrst we determine a set of common features for intended EAP methods
and then we will compare the most relevant EAP methods (in section 5.4.2) based on those
features. Thereby, we reduce the size of the set of potential EAP methods to be used in
our multicast distribution to eventually reach the most suitable one.
Here, we are explaining a set of speciﬁcations according to which, we will build the ﬁrst
set of nine EAP methods (in section 5.4.2) out of almost forty diﬀerent available ones.
• Not sent in clear text : Many EAP methods exchange authentication messages in
clear text. In order to reduce the risk of replay and spooﬁng attacks, it is highly
recommended to exchange EAP messages encrypted.
• Dynamic key exchange: This distributes a user speciﬁc encryption key to the peer.
Without this feature, all users must share the same static encryption key which in-
creases the chance of a wide attack to all the users.
• Mutual authentication: This enables the receiver to authenticate the sender in addition
to the sender that typically authenticates the receiver.
• Password-based authentication / Card-based token / Digital certiﬁcate: This shows
the nature of credentials to exchange and likely to use for authentication.
• Secure tunnel : It is desirable to establish an encrypted channel between the EAP peer
and the EAP server to securely exchange authentication messages and encryption
keys (if needed). Encrypted tunnel is useful also for securing further exchange of
information.
• Flexibility : The right EAP method has to have the ﬂexibility to enable support for
most password authentication interfaces perfectly consistently. Moreover, the method
must be expandable to use multiple existing authentication protocols (if required
by the architecture) as well as to enable exchange of authorization and accounting
information.
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• Eﬃciency : The right EAP method must facilitate the use of a single strong shared
secret by the EU in order to allow him to use that shared secret to secure the path of
communication similar to use his user name and password to access to the network.
This minimizes the device state of the server that the server has to cache and manage.
The ‘fast reconnect’ mode reduces resource requirements for the servers too.
• Security : We will discuss a generic attack model (in section 5.4.6) against the im-
plementation of AAA [9] functionalities. Therefore, the EAP candidate must provide
protection against common attacks such as Man-in-the-middle, Dictionary attack and
Replay attack.
5.4.2 Comparison of Candidate EAP Methods
As shown in table 1, we introduce the following EAP methods as candidates to use in mul-
ticast content delivery technology and compare them based on the aforementioned features
(in section 5.4.1).
1. EAP-MD5 : The EAP with MD5 challenge type [12] is similar to the PPP CHAP pro-
tocol [21] with MD5 as the speciﬁc algorithm. This algorithm is used by the peer to
response to the “challenge” message request. All the messages are sent in clear text
and the method is a password-based or pre-shared key authentication protocol. It
does not support mutual authentication and can be seriously violated by a dictionary
attack.
2. EAP-GTC : The EAP with Generic Token Card type [22, 12] is deﬁned to work
with various token cards supporting challenge/response authentication. The chal-
lenge/response messages contain the token card information that is necessary for au-
thentication. The peer might read this information from the token card device and
enter them in the communication path in ASCII text. Therefore, this method must
not be used to provide support for clear text passwords in the absence of a secure
path between the EAP peer and the EAP back-end authentication server.
3. EAP-OTP : The One-Time Password protocol [23, 24] contains an OTP challnge for
which a response must be sent in reply to the request. The EAP-OTP method is
designed to be used with the one-time password system only, and must not be used to
provide support for clear text password. Although EAP-OTP method provides replay
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protection, it provides neither dictionary attack resistance nor mutual authentication.
4. EAP-MSCHAP : EAP-Microsoft Challenge Handshake Accept Protocol [12] provides
mutual authentication. It uses a Microsoft algorithm to hash passwords for mutual
authentication purpose and sends the hashed-password over the communication path.
However, it is still not protected against dictionary attack.
5. EAP-PSK : The Pre-Shared Key Extensible Authentication Protocol [25] is an EAP
method that uses a Pre-Shared Key for mutual authentication and session key deriva-
tion. It is documented as a experimental IETF standard for authentication without
a need for any public-key cryptography.
6. EAP-TLS : The EAP-Transport Layer Security [26, 27] is an IETF standard with high
level of security. It uses PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) to secure communications of
the peer with the authentication server. EAP-TLS is originally designed as a wireless
LAN (Local Area Network) authentication protocol. It is considered one of the secure
EAP standards that support mutual authentication. Unlike the previously-mentioned
EAP methods, EAP-TLS requires a client-side certiﬁcate for authentication. This
gives EAP-TLS its authentication strength and illustrates the convenience vs. secu-
rity trade-oﬀ.
7. EAP-TTLS : The EAP-Tunneled Transport Layer Security [28] is developed in re-
sponse to the PKI barrier in EAP-TLS. It is a two-stage protocol that establishes a
secure TLS tunnel in stage one and then exchanges authentication information in the
form of Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs). It provides mutual authentication, uses digi-
tal certiﬁcates for server authentication and exchanges user credentials in the secure
tunnel for peer authentication.
8. EAP-IKEv2 : The EAP-IKEv2 [29] is an EAP method based on the Internet Key
Exchange protocol version 2 [30]. It provides mutual authentication and session key
establishment between the EAP peer and the EAP back-end authentication server.
EAP-IKEv2 provides high security properties against potential attacks 5.4.6 and en-
ables the EAP peer and the EAP server to authenticate each other with diﬀerent
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techniques. Further information will be provided in section 5.5.3.
9. EAP-FAST : The EAP-Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling [13] is proposed
as an IETF standard that has two main and one optional phases. In phase 1, it uses
a Protected Access Credential (PAC) to establish a TLS tunnel and in phase 2, the
peer’s credentials are exchanged and veriﬁed. Phase 0 is an optional phase in which
the PAC can be provisioned manually or dynamically. EAP-FAST provides mutual
authentication with an optional use of server certiﬁcate and its highly-secured TLS
tunnel allows the peer and the server to exchange further credentials and important
information.
5.4.3 Functionality Requirements
In the secure IP multicast technology, the agreed-upon EAP method between the EU and
the AR requires a set of properties to be able to perform successfully. It has to mutually
authenticate the EU and the CP successfully and have enough ﬂexibility to extend the
communications for authorization and accounting all in a suﬃcient way.
Authentication
In order to implement AAA [9, 31] functionalities, the MR issues the token including proper
information. Authentication procedures start once the EU wants to connect to the multicast
session and presents his token to the NSP components. The EU cannot connect to the
multicast session unless his identity is veriﬁed in advance. In fact, authentication of the EU
is not a separate process to be done after a set of EU-NSP negotiations. The authentication
step presents within those negotiations.
Flexibility
Given the fact that within the architecture, a wide range of various multicast services [19] is
provided for a wide range of diﬀerent end users and many diﬀerent ways exist to authenticate
an end user, the architecture must have a ﬂexible authentication method in accordance with
the content of the token. Flexibility of the authentication method is mandatory to extend
the communications of the EU and NSP components too. The growing complexity in
network infrastructures for routing purposes and also the need to gain authorization and
accounting features in the design best shows the need for a ﬂexible authentication method.
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Eﬃciency
With a large deployment of the architecture for on schedule multicast services, it is probable
that there will be many end users connected to a small number of EAP Servers. Moreover,
if the EU either lost the ﬁrst authorization but not the connection to the multicast session
or wishes to receive the multicast content on discrete time slots, the authentication method
must facilitate a ‘fast reconnect’ mode to enable the EU to again reach the multicast session
quickly to proceed the next two steps (authorization and accounting). So, it is highly
desirable to reduce the EAP Server’s per user requirements to gain eﬃciency in addition to
ﬂexibility.
5.4.4 Security Requirements
The secure IP multicast is useful only if it makes revenue from valid end users as well as
prevents non-purchasers from taking free advantages of the multicast service. In general,
security is essential for that reason. If no precise and reliable security exists, even a small
leakage can give the attackers the opportunity to take big advantages and devastate the
revenue generation.
In order to understand security requirements, based on the multicast content delivery
architecture [1] and the EAP framework explained in chapter 3, a reasonable set of potential
attacks (see section 5.4.6) are considered in this thesis, against which the intended EAP
method must provide security. On this way, some security assumptions are made as follows:
5.4.5 Security Assumptions
According to the chapters 2 and 3, we are able to determine the type and number of the
participants, their roles and the nature of their communications in the secure IP multicast
technology. Considering these parameters ensures us that the model will not neglect any
potential attack. In fact, there are three main participants in this part of the secure IP mul-
ticast technology that we observe to track AAA functionalities: the End User, the Access
Router (co-located with a Network Access Server) and the EAP Server (co-located with a
AAA Server). Communications of these three participants and the exchanged information
between them are subject to various attacks. Since these three participants are not neces-
sarily connected to each other via trusted paths and very likely an intruder is able to reside
between them, any kind of attack that needs an attacker to sit between the actors must be
considered in the threat model. Speciﬁcally, the attacker can listen to the communication
from the beginning and gain access to all the public information (e.g., public keys and rout-
ing information). Also, the attacker may have the knowledge of old pre-shared secret keys.
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However, we assume that:
1. All the initiations among the network-side participants have been already done se-
curely and the attacker does not have a chance to access databases of the participants
in advance.
2. No attacker has an advance knowledge about the content of the token.
3. Network routers have installed ﬁrewalls and proxies to secure themselves and their
communications.
4. The AR has secure communications with the NAS and so does the EAP Server with
the AAA Server.
5. The EAP method and even its immediate carriers (the IGMP-AC [14] and Diame-
ter [16] frameworks) are run on top of the network layer and subsequently our model
considers any attack that can happen on top of the network Layer. So, communica-
tions in the physical layer are assumed to be done securely.
5.4.6 A Generic Attack Model
We deﬁne the following generic threat model, in which the attacker may carry out a number
of attacks to violate either the network security concepts or the data security concepts.
We believe our model includes the most likely-to-happen attacks and threats during the
implementation of AAA functionalities.
• An attacker may attempt to discover the user identity to violate secure authentication
by spooﬁng the authentication traﬃc.
• An attacker may try to convince the parties that they are talking directly to each
other while in a form of active eavesdropping he makes independent connections with
the victims and carries out a man-in-the-middle attack.
• Mounting a man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker may try to convince the peer to
connect to an untrusted authenticator.
• An attacker may try to modify or spoof EAP packets and subsequently the content
of the token.
• An attacker may replay EAP packets or generate packets with overlapping identi-
ﬁers to launch a denial of service attack. Obviously, he needs to spoof lower layer
indications or Success/Failure packets for that reason.
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• An attacker may try to defeat the authentication mechanism by mounting an online
and/or oﬄine dictionary attack and determining the decryption keys.
5.5 Most relevant EAP Methods
According to the signiﬁcance of providingmutual authentication, dynamic key exchange and
secure tunnel establishment during the authentication steps via the intended EAP method,
we provide a detailed discussion on EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, EAP-IKEv2 and EAP-FAST
methods since they satisfy the basic and important requirements.
If authentication of network users is not strong, unauthorized users may be able to
access network resources as well as access multicast sessions. Strong authentication is
a key component in the multicast content delivery technology to provide an acceptable
level of authentication. Moreover, in secure multicast technology, only legitimate senders
are allowed to distribute the multicast content on the transmission path. In comparison
with regular multicast technology, in secure multicast technology intruders cannot deliver
garbage to users and take their credentials. Mutual authentication, in addition to strong
authentication is needed to provide enough security during the authentication procedures.
Therefore, the intended EAP method must provide strong mutual authentication.
Strong authentication is achievable only if both parties dynamically exchange the keys
for encryption. Pre-shared keys are vulnerable to replay and man-in-the-middle attacks and
do not provide security for authentication. Consequently, the intended EAP method must
provide dynamic key exchange too.
In multicast technology, authorization and accounting are the next steps after a success-
ful authentication. Revenue generation is not guaranteed unless authorization information
is transferred securely and so is accounting information. Once a secure tunnel is established
between the EAP peer and the EAP back-end authentication server, they can exchange
further information in addition to authentication information. As the result, a securely
established tunnel is a privilege for the intended EAP method.
In response to the problems about weak authentication, a series of new authentication
protocols have been developed to provide strong authentication. EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS,
EAP-IKEv2 and EAP-FAST provide strong authentication, each with its own strengths
and weaknesses as shown in table 2.
5.5.1 EAP-TLS
EAP-TLS [27, 26] exchanges digital certiﬁcates to authenticate both the peer and the server
as part of the TLS establishment and so requiring digital certiﬁcates is mandatory for both
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the peer and the server in EAP-TLS.
This method does not provide fast session reconnect mode. Authentication of peers
by means of digital certiﬁcates, which mandates a PKI in place. Since usually PKI is not
already there, the additional work in issuing and managing certiﬁcates is too large.
5.5.2 EAP-TTLS
EAP-TTLS [28] was developed originally in response to the PKI barrier in EAP-TLS.
Instead, it exchanges “attribute-value pairs” (AVPs) for peer authentication between the
peer and the TTLS server through the TLS tunnel. So, some extra work is required to
be done by the peer to prepare AVPs and send them. In EAP-TTLS, server certiﬁcate
is required (for server authentication) but peer certiﬁcate is optional as AVPs are in use.
Therefore, the protocol has potential for man-in-the-middle attacks.
5.5.3 EAP-IKEv2
EAP-IKEv2 [29] provides mutual authentication via session key establishment. Typically
it supports authentication techniques based on the following types of credentials:
• Public/Private key pairs (Asymmetric key pairs)
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• High entropy bit strings (Symmetric keys)
• Low entropy bit strings (Passwords)
This enables the peer and the server to use diﬀerent authentication information (and
thus technique) in each direction. This method protects the authentication procedures
and actors against replay and dictionary attacks. It also provides fast session reconnect.
However, the session keys have potential for man-in-the-middle attack and therefore, it is not
safe to exchange authorization and accounting information (in addition to authentication
information) with them.
5.6 Extensible Authentication Protocol - Flexible Authenti-
cation via Secure Tunneling (EAP-FAST)
EAP-FAST [13] is an EAP method that enables secure communication between the EAP
peer and the EAP server by means of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) to establish a se-
cure and mutually authenticated tunnel. It has many functionality and security advantages
over other EAP methods.
5.6.1 EAP-FAST features in general
According to the following features and properties (see also sections 5.6.2, 5.6.3 and 5.7),
we believe that EAP-FAST best suits in secure multicast content delivery architecture. In
this section, EAP-FAST is discussed from a top level of view and a formal validation is
provided in chapter 6.
• The method, provides strong mutual authentication through its established secure
TLS tunnel. It is important to note that it uses Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
to establish the tunnel. This structure (unlike EAP-TLS, which uses PKI and un-
like EAP-TTLS, which uses AVPs) does not add too much work on the components
thanks to the simplicity of issuing and using PACs.
• EAP-FAST in phase 1, establishes its secure TLS tunnel and actually generates fresh
secret keys during the authentication procedures. It can use the keys for further en-
cryption of important information such as authorization and accounting credentials.
Secure transmission of authorization and accounting credentials in multicast archi-
tecture is as essential as providing a successful strong authentication since revenue
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generation is related to all the three steps not only the ﬁrst one.
• In EAP-FAST, neither peer nor server certiﬁcate is used in establishment of the TLS
tunnel. Unlike EAP-TLS (which also established a TLS tunnel), the peer credentials
are exchanged and protected inside the encrypted tunnel. Therefore, EAP-FAST is
more secure and ﬂexible to implement.
• Given the exchange of newly generated fresh secret keys between the peer and the
server, the method oﬀers high protection against (passive) dictionary attack, packet
forgery (replay attack), authentication forging and man-in-the-middle attacks. It pro-
vides ‘password expiration and change’ to mitigate active dictionary attack too. No
other EAP method mitigates all these vulnerabilities simultaneously. This also results
in conﬁdentiality and integrity of EAP-FAST.
• Similar to the actual implementation of the multicast content delivery that would be
in real world, server authentication is optional in EAP-FAST while peer authenti-
cation is mandatory. Since it does not require any server-side certiﬁcate, it is very
easy to deploy, scale and manage. Fast session reconnect mode is an addition to the
ﬂexibility and eﬃciency of EAP-FAST.
5.6.2 Functionality requirements of the architecture and EAP-FAST cor-
responding features
Although we wish to lay out the eﬀective security aspects of the EAP-FAST method in
the main, considering functionality requirements of the design (see section 5.4.3), here we
discuss corresponding properties of EAP-FAST in brief to show that it does not fail to
perform its authentication task having enough ﬂexibility in an eﬃcient way.
In the secure IP multicast technology, the agreed-upon EAP method between the EU
and the AR requires a set of properties to be able to perform successfully. It must mutually
authenticate the EU and the CP and have enough ﬂexibility to extend the communications
for authorization and accounting too, all in a suﬃcient way. We demonstrate below that
the EAP-FAST method possesses the required functional features.
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Authentication
The EAP-FAST provides authentication of the EU while the EU and the NSP negotiates
with each other. We will see (in section 5.5) that the EAP-FAST provides an authentication
of the NSP too.
Flexibility
In accordance with the ﬂexibility requirements (see section 5.4.3), the EAP-FAST method
has the ﬂexibility to enable support for most password authentication interfaces (e.g.,
MSCHAP and OTP). Moreover, the method extends to use multiple existing authentication
protocols (if required by the architecture) as well as to enable exchange of authorization
and accounting information through its secure TLS channel.
Eﬃciency
As eﬃciency of the EAP method is highly demanded (see section 5.4.3), the EAP-FAST
method facilitates the use of a single strong shared secret by the EU in order to allow him
to use that shared secret to secure the TLS tunnel similar to use his username and password
to access to the network. This minimizes the device state of the server that the server has
to cache and manage. The ‘fast reconnect’ mode exists in the EAP-FAST method, which
reduces resource requirements for the servers too.
5.6.3 Security requirements of the architecture and EAP-FAST corre-
sponding features
Revenue generation in multicast is dependent on the security requirements (see section 5.4.4)
being met. In the ﬁeld of computer networks, the area of security includes two main con-
cepts: the network security concepts (e.g., authenticity, availability) and the information
security concepts (e.g., conﬁdentiality, integrity). If an attacker violates any of these con-
cepts, the whole security would be broken. We will discuss EAP-FAST corresponding
security features in section 5.7.
5.7 EAP-FAST Security Claims
In this section, we articulate the security provided by the EAP-FAST method to protect
the architecture against the previously mentioned vulnerabilities as a generic attack model
in section 5.4.6. We will also justify our proposed security claims.
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5.7.1 Conﬁdentiality and Integrity
Although an identity exchange is optional within the EAP negotiations of the peer and the
authenticator, it is not desirable to entirely omit it due to the complexity that would be
added to the EAP packets for routing purposes.
Typically, the EAP-FAST provides message protection by establishing a secure tunnel
via Transport Layer Security (TLS) for protecting the authentication method. Moreover,
the TLS is employing a strong entropy shared master secret key that results in the conﬁ-
dentiality and integrity protection of the EAP packets.
5.7.2 Mutual Authentication and Mitigation of Man-in-the-Middle At-
tacks
Wrapping EAP within another protocol enables a rogue EAP packet authenticator to attack
as a MitM by tunneling EAP to a legitimate server. Where the tunneling protocol does not
require peer authentication, an attacker convincing a legitimate EU to connect to it will be
able to tunnel EAP packets to a legitimate server. This allows the attacker to successfully
establish himself as a MitM, gaining access to the multicast session as well as the ability to
decrypt multicast content between the CP and the EU.
EAP-FAST mitigates this attack by using the PAC-Key to mutually authenticate both
the EU and the EAPS during phase 1 of the EAP-FAST run. In phase 1, the EAP Server
and the EU mutually authenticate each other.
5.7.3 Dictionary Attack Resistance
Since password authentication algorithms are known to be vulnerable to dictionary attacks,
in general it is recommended to use authentication methods that are resistant to dictio-
nary attacks. However, the EAP-FAST mitigates dictionary attacks by establishing the
mutually authenticated and encrypted TLS tunnel to protect even weak credential based
authentication methods. Therefore, regardless of the exchanged authentication credentials,
EAP-FAST is dictionary attack resistant.
5.7.4 Protection against packet modiﬁcation and forged clear text EAP
packets
Since the identiﬁer ﬁeld in the EAP packet format is only a single octet, it is fairly easy to
guess it and allow an attacker to successfully inject or replay EAP packets. If the header
of the EAP packet is not protected, the attacker also will be able to modify EAP headers,
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which can cause packets to be inappropriately discarded or misinterpreted. Moreover, EAP
Success and Failure packets are exchanged in clear text. An attacker may try to forge either
a Failure packet to convince an EAP peer to disconnect or a Success packet to convince
the EAP peer that authentication has succeeded even though the authenticator has not
authenticated himself to the peer.
EAP-FAST provides protection against these attacks by providing message conﬁden-
tiality and integrity. The EAP-FAST peer does not rely upon unprotected EAP Success
and Failure messages. It accepts only Success/Failure decisions indicated by a protected
mechanism within the EAP-FAST tunnel. As the result of the strong mutual authentication
of the EU and the EAP Server, the TLS tunnel is established securely between the EU and
the EAP Server and provides a protected path to exchange Success/Failure messages.
5.7.5 Mitigation of connecting to an Entrusted Authenticator
EAP-FAST provides the server certiﬁcate validation capability as part of the TLS negoti-
ation during which the EAP Server presents a certiﬁcate to the EU. In order to determine
whether the EAP Server can be trusted or not, the EU has to verify the validity of the





Since network security has become a very important and complex ﬁeld of research nowadays,
in this section we would like to apply it to the discussion of exchanging sensitive data over
the Internet through multicast communications, ﬁnding an appropriate and trustworthy
mechanism to map the proposed frameworks and methods to the mechanism and eventually
validating them.
6.2 AVISPA: The Validation Tool
A purely mathematical and analytical discussion on the problem of validating such protocols
(more speciﬁcally, frameworks and methods) may quickly exhaust the reader. So, we tried
to ﬁnd a tool that can be used to automate the whole work of validating the exchanges
within those frameworks and methods. In this chapter, we will provide a formal tool-based
analysis of the claimed security properties for participant exchange controls.
The AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications)
Model Checker is a modern security tool to prove the correctness and attack-free working
of the Internet security protocols. The tool provides a programming language called High
Level Protocol Speciﬁcation Language (HLPSL) for describing proposed security protocols,
frameworks and methods as well as specifying their prospective and intended security fea-
tures. It is worthwhile to note that mapping the input correctly to the AVISPA model
is crucial to demonstrate the output results. Then, the AVISPA randomly considers all
possible events to try and track as various simulation scenarios. The tool analyzes them
systematically and explores the results whether it ﬁnds an attack and reports an unsafe
message or ﬁnds no attack and reports a safe message. Obviously, the ﬁnal results are
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reported according to the set of goals that has to be deﬁned and determined precisely in the
HLPSL code. Therefore, a safe result represents that no attacker can break the pre-deﬁned
security goals but it does not justify mitigation against other types of vulnerabilities.
The internal translator of the AVISPA tool translates the HLPSL code into the Inter-
mediate Format (IF), which is read directly by a back-end. The AVISPA tool comprises
four back-ends [32] as shown in Figure 10:
1. On-the-ﬂy Model-Checker (OFMC) employs several symbolic techniques to explore
the state space in a demand-driven way.
2. CL-AtSe (Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher) applies constraint solving with
simpliﬁcation heuristics and redundancy elimination techniques.
3. The SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) builds a propositional formula encoding all
the possible traces (of bounded length) on the protocol and uses a SAT solver.
4. TA4SP (Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Se-
curity Protocols) approximates the intruder knowledge by using regular tree languages
and rewriting to produce under and over approximations.
Translator
HLPSL2IF











Model−Checker Attack Searcher Protocol Analyser
Figure 10: AVISPA back-ends
44
This list may later be extended with new back-ends for other purposes. However, since
more than 85% of the attacks and threats can usually be found by the ﬁrst two back-ends
(according to the AVISPA guidelines) [32, 33] and the other two are not designed to track




































































Figure 11: EAP-FAST message exchange
6.3 The Developed AVISPA Model
6.3.1 The Plan
In order to model EAP-FAST with HLPSL language, see ﬁgure 11, there is a set of message
exchanges between the peer (as the EU) and the server (as the EAPS). We have modeled
our protocol through the following main steps.
It starts with an “EAP request” and “EAP reaponse” between the peer and the server.
Then, EAP-FAST is established through a three-way handshake for establishing the TLS
tunnel. Eventually, once the TLS tunnel is established and consequently the newly-generated
secret keys are exchanged between the peer and the server, Authorization and Accounting
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information are transferred securely using the new keys. The ﬁnal success messages termi-
nate the protocol.
6.3.2 HLPSL Features
Here, ﬁrst we are going to explain some of the HLPSL features, which helped us coding our
protocol with HLPSL and deﬁning the correctness of our model. Then, in section 6.3.4, we
will explain various parts of our protocol that we have considered to develop our model.
1. In the real world of multicast communications, there are several actors playing their
role. In this thesis, in order to being able to validate the security of participant control
exchanges, we consider two of the participants work as the main actors: The EU and
the EAPS (co-located with the AAAS). In HLPSL as a role-based language, we can
deﬁne a “basic role” that speciﬁes the actions of each kind of actors in a module.
For each type of actor in the protocol, there is one basic role deﬁning his sequence
of actions. Here, we have deﬁned “auth-server” to act as the EAPS and also deﬁned
“peer” to act as the EU.
Figure 12: Basic role in HLPSL
2. Since each actor in real world communicates with other actors, HLPSL enables us to
deﬁne a set of parameters for each basic role. The section of Global parameters for each
actor includes a prototype of other agents (speciﬁc instant of a basic role), with whom
the actor communicates. Also it includes hash functions to encrypt data streams, send
channels and receive channels. Each actor should have a separate “SND” channel to
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every other actor as well as a separate “RCV” channel from each of them. The section
of local parameters, mostly includes a prototype of various nonces. A nonce may be
used as a key, cipher suite, certiﬁcate and session id. In this section, local variable of
“state” is also deﬁned as a “natural” variable to be able to transit the state of the
actor to model his actions in the real world.
3. Constants are also available to be deﬁned to model “request-id”, “response-id”, “protocol-
id” and “start-eap-fast” ﬂag.
4. In real world of multicast communications, actions of actors means producing and
possessing data streams, sending information, receiving information, hashing data
streams and performing mathematical operations, all of which are possible to model
in HLPSL. In fact, we can deﬁne diﬀerent states for each actor and model the actions
by diﬀerent transitions from one state to another one.
5. A basic role with all its parameters, states and transitions best models an actor (See
ﬁgure 12).
6. Once every individual basic role is deﬁned in HLPSL, we need to model communica-
tions of the actors. For that reason, we can have a “composition” of diﬀerent actors
in a “session”, which in fact models a set of actors and all their communications.
Communications in a session are bounded within that session that is, no outside actor
is able to join the communications at this step (see ﬁgure 13).
Figure 13: Composition of various roles to make a session
It is important to ensure that whatever is sent through a “SND” channel from actor A
to actor B, is actually received by actor B at a moment. Otherwise, AVISPA will not
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be able to validate secrecy goal (see section 6.4 for further information about security
goals).
7. In order to model the real multicast world more generically, HLPSL enables us to carry
out more than one session simultaneously. We can model many multicast sessions
over a speciﬁc multicast service. Consequently, more than one EU is acting and
so the EAPS is. As shown in ﬁgure 14, a composition of many sessions is called
“environment” in HLPSL. Therefore, many EUs and many EAPSs are present and
communicate with each other in an environment. AVISPA engines generate sessions
as much as needed and keep looking to ﬁnd a violation of security goals between
various actors from diﬀerent sessions.
Figure 14: Composition of various sessions to make an environment
8. Generally speaking, an attacker has a set of information and knowledge about his
target. Although we made some security assumptions in section 5.4.5, at attacker
may have a prior knowledge about the number of actors, location of actors, path of
communication between the actors, public keys of the actors and some pre-deﬁned
hash functions. Deﬁning the intruder knowledge enables us to model as accurately
as possible. There is an opportunity to add to the intruder’s knowledge for future
developments too.
6.3.3 Developing the HLPSL model
Developing the HLPSL code by means of the tools (see section 6.3.2) was a straightforward
and sometimes tricky procedure. Here, we go into the steps that we passed to achieve the
ﬁnal results.
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1. In the protocol, there are certain actors: The EU, the AR and the EAPS, playing
their roles. Since the AR is a forwarder of messages between the other two and is
not even able to interpret the token’s content (except the routing information), we
considered only the EU and the EAPS as main actors to be modeled with HLPSL.
There is no need to model an actor that does not possess any message to exchange
and only forwards messages from the EU to the EAPS and vice versa.
2. In the real world of multicast, there are thousands of EUs asking for a speciﬁc multicast
application. Also each one may request diﬀerent multicast data streams from an NSP.
Therefore, we need to invent a way to distinguish an EU from others as well as any
request of the EU from its other requests. At the beginning we did not model this step
for each EU. An EU could start the negotiation with an EAPS and “start-eap-fast”
right away. Gradually, we improved the code with a “request-id” from the EU and a
“response-id” from the EAPS to be able to assign a random and unique number to
each request of each of the EUs and consequently distinguish diﬀerent requests of the
same EU.
3. While an EU is able to make diﬀerent requests in one session, similar to have a way
to identfy the EU itself and its request, we improved our code with a session ID
to be able to track the exchanged information within a multicast session. Without
the “SessID” variable, in a composition of basic roles within one “session”, it is not
possible for AVISPA engines to track an exchanged message to monitor secrecy of
the message. However, by means of “SessID” and concatenation of that to a set of
exchanged information, as long as the whole string is not taken by another agent
(obviously with a diﬀerent “SessID” that might be an attacker), secrecy of the string
is met.
AVISPA engines have the ability to monitor a piece of exchanged information to see
if it is possible for others (instead of the intended recipients) to capture it. In such a
case, it reports an unsafe protocol. “SessID” provides this ability in our code.
Before adding “SessID” to our code, we were not sure that once a piece of information
is exchanged whether it is actually received by the intended receiver or not. Adding
“SessID” to our code, ﬁxed this shortage and increased the accuracy of one of our
main goals, secrecy of exchanged information.
4. Strong mutual authentication is one of the most important features of the EAP-FAST
that we had to compltely model it in HLPSL. As opposed to ‘weak authentication’,
‘strong authentication’ is used in the literature and it means one party authenticates
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the other one not only based on a simple one-way exchange of identity but also, en-
cryption and concatenation of nonces and identity are involved. Fortunately, AVISPA
engines are able to validate strong authentication of each of the actors. During a
few ﬁrst steps, we failed modeling strong authentication with HLPSL. However, we
eventually reached the correct code and here are the tips towards modeling strong
authentication:
• In the ﬁrst round of exchanging authentication information from A to B, once
a nonce is generated, a “SessID” as an identiﬁer must be attached to it. An
encryption of the generator agents’s name and its public key-encrypted with the
opaque part of the PAC (called ‘Kar’ in the code) is attached to the string too.
• In the second round of exchanging information from B to A, the message from
the previous round must be decrypted using the same ‘Kar’. B is able to split
the message into its components and use them to build the new string to send. B
must generate its new nonce, concatenate his name and A’s nonce to it, encrypt
them together and add the result to the encrypted message he has received from
A. The whole thing is now sent to A using a hash function (common between A
and B).
Figure 15: Server authentication is optional (peer part)
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• On each step, we must correctly code the prototype of the exchanged message
for the intended receiver. The prototype must be deﬁned for the receiver, exactly
similar to what has been modeled for the sender (generator of the nonce and the
exchanged message).
• Server authentication in EAP-FAST is optional. In our HLPSL code we modeled
this feature too. In fact, in the “role peer” in state 5 and 7, “Phellodone” must
be removed from the code (see ﬁgure 15) to skip server authentication and in the
“role auth-server” in state 4, the same part of the message (“Phellodone”) must
be removed from the receiver message too (See ﬁgure 16).
This means the peer does not wish to authenticate the EAP server. Therefore,
the whole part in “SND-P” in the “role auth-server” in state 4 must be removed
(since no more server certiﬁcate is going to be exchanged) and so must be the
whole ﬁrst “RCV-S” in the “role peer” in state 5 and 7.
Figure 16: Server authentication is optional (server part)
• In order to validate the modeled strong mutual authentication, based on the set
of exchange information, we must ask AVISPA engines to monitor authenticity
of A by B by means of a set of generated and exchanged nonces and vice versa.
5. Establishing the TLS tunnel means exchanging a pair of fresh secret keys after the
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strong mutual authentication of both parties. In our model, we have successfully
established the TLS tunnel and the next step was to exchange a stream of data as
‘authorization’ and ‘accounting’ information of the EU. We have deﬁned “Finished”
variable to encrypt it by new “ClientK” and “SeverK” secret keys and exchange it
between the two agents. See ﬁgure 17.
Figure 17: Secure exchange of further information
For each of the agents, we had to add the agents’s cipher suite too to the beginning
of authorization and accounting information (“Finished”) of that agent to be able to
give a hint to AVISPA engines for tracking purposes of “Finished”.
6.3.4 Our Model
In this section we describe how we modeled the proposed IETF document of the EAP-FAST
method with HLPSL language to meet the AVISPA validation requirements.
• The EAP-FAST method uses a Protected Access Credential (PAC) to establish a
secure TLS tunnel in which intended client credentials will be veriﬁed. EAP-FAST
has two main phases and an optional phase 0. In Phase 1, the EU and the EAP
Server uses the PAC to establish the TLS tunnel and in Phase 2, the EU credentials
are exchanged, inside the secure tunnel. Typically, in Phase 0, the PAC can be
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provisioned manually or dynamically.
Phase 0 is outside the scope of the IETF document [13]. It does not have any eﬀect
on the nature of the two other phases either and has to be done before the ﬁrst
authentication step starts. In addition, considering the HLPSL privilege on variables,
the PAC in EAP-FAST is modeled by means of a global variable ‘Kar’ that is deﬁned
as a public key to enable us to have a protected access information in our AVISPA
model. Therefore, there is no need to consider provisioning the PAC in our model.
• The HLPSL language is a role-based language, which means we determine the se-
quence of actions and properties of each kind of participant in a module called a basic
role. Here, we deﬁne two general types of basic roles: the role peer and the role au-
thentication server, which gives us the ability to describe the two required agents and
the way of exchanging security sensitive data between those agents.
Agents are the Peer (which represents the EU) and the Server (which represents the
EAP Server). A deﬁnition of the role is given as: ‘played by’, where we specify the
agent and its local variable(s).
• We deﬁned global variables for each role as well as local variables and constants.
Usually, transmission channels (sending) to and (receiving) from other agents and
public keys are deﬁned as global variables while diﬀerent nonces, session IDs, hash
functions and secret keys are deﬁned as local variables. Local variables may transfer
between the agents through the transmission channels. This is the actual way that
we naturally modeled exchange of nonces into the HLPSL language.
• In HLPSL, local variables have the ability to be changed and transferred but they
cannot be shared. Yet, it is possible to share a constant value as well as to negotiate
on the value of a global variable and share that one whenever we require roles to have
pre-shared knowledge (e.g., a shared key).
• In the transition section, for each role we speciﬁed diﬀerent state(s) to be able to model
communications of the two agents, generating new strings of bytes mostly as nonces,
sending and receiving credentials, performing algebraic operations as well as hashing
on nonces; all regarding the secret key generation and exchange authentication of the
agents and establishment of the secure TLS tunnel.
As shown in Figure 11, exactly the same steps as in a real run of the EAF-FAST are
done in our model to provide the strong mutual authentication and the secure TLS
tunnel. As a matter of fact, the veriﬁcation of the certiﬁcates is the strong mutual
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authentication and the exchange of the fresh secret keys is the establishment of the
secure TLS tunnel, which enables both agents to transfer further intended information
(for authorization and accounting purposes) in a secure encrypted way.
It is worthwhile to note that our model optionally sends the server certiﬁcate to the
peer for veriﬁcation in order to model the optional authentication of the server in the
EAP-FAST method.
• We assigned state numbers to reﬂect the intended order of the send and receive events.
That is, we modeled the order of exchanging information of the EAP-FAST in the
HLPSL language and have them performed in the same order as they are done in
the actual EAP-FAST method (see Figure 11). As an example, the EU ﬁrst has to
initiate an EAP session with his request to the EAP Server and receives the response
back, then he can start establishment of the TLS tunnel. Therefore, it is required to
assign a lower number to the ﬁrst state and a higher number to the next one for both
of the agents to follow the order.
• In order to have one whole protocol session, we deﬁned a composed role, which instan-
tiates one instance of each basic role actually by gluing them together so that they
execute together in parallel with interleaving semantics. This enables us also to de-
ﬁne an intruder session with certain knowledge of the public symmetric keys, channels
and agents. This is a great capability of AVISPA to execute more than one session in
parallel and place an intruder in a session to simulate various events and eventually
justify the validation results. In fact, AVISPA looks for any possible scenario that
can result in violating any of the security goals. Therefore, a safe summary result
strongly claims that the protocol is attack free according to the model.
6.4 Specifying the AVISPA Security Goals
In order to have a meaningful validation of the security properties by AVISPA, in addition to
model the protocol itself with HLPSL, it is required to specify the security goals in HLPSL
too. It can be done by augmenting the transitions of the basic roles with so-called goal facts.
Any kind of security sensitive data that has to be exchanged needs AVISPA back-ends to
track its conﬁdentiality, integrity and safe transmission. Once we inform AVISPA about
the goal facts, we need to then assign them a meaning by describing them in the HLPSL
goal section. This will clarify what combination of such facts indicates an attack.
From our perspective of view as a user, we believe that we correctly requested the
AVISPA model checker to witness the secrecy of the intended data carefully and stated the
54
goal section in the HLPSL properly according to the generic attack model (in section 5.6.3).
In the goal section of our HLPSL code (see Figure 18), we explicitly ask the AVISPA model
checker to validate the secrecy of both the peer and the server’s fresh secret keys, which
ensures the intended security of further communications (in the TLS channel); and also to
validate the mutual authentication of both agents on their own nonces, which ensures the
strong mutual authentication. Therefore, we claim that the ﬁnal safe report is accurately
obtained.
goal 
        %secrecy_of ClientK, ServerK 
        secrecy_of sec_clientK, sec_serverK 
        %Peer authenticates Server on nps1 
        authentication_on nps1 
        %Server authenticates Peer on nps2 
        authentication_on nps2 
end goal 
Figure 18: The goal section in our HLPSL code
The witness and request events are goal facts related to authentication of an agent. We
used them to check whether or not an agent is right in believing that its intended peer
that is actually present in the current session, has reached a deﬁnite state in its transition
section and agrees on a certain value, which usually is a fresh nonce. The fresh nonce is
actually generated by each agent to authenticate the other one.
In fact, we used AVISPA to validate two main classiﬁcations of security goals:
• secrecy
• authenticity
The secrecy goal conﬁrms the inability of a third party to discover even a part of the
content exchanged between a sender and a receiver that is supposed to be kept secret. The
authenticity goal veriﬁes a distinguishing identiﬁer (e.g., a newly-generated nonce encrypted
by a pseudo random function) claimed by or for an agent, which may be a peer in a
communication or the source of some data as a server. The veriﬁcation is achieved presenting
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authentication information (credentials) that corroborates the binding between the agent
and the identiﬁer.
Given the general concept of these two main security goals and the possibility of using
them in accordance with any kind of exchanged data with choosing any agent in the model
as the sender and receiver of the data, we believe they are capable of validating the protocol
against a wide range of attacks and threats including what we proposed in section 5.6.3.
As a simple example on secrecy where the goal facts assert which values should be kept
secret between whom and in the goal section they are described, any time the intruder learns
a secret value which is not explicitly a secret between him and someone else, it should be
considered an attack.
6.5 The AVISPA Results
We developed our code in HLPSL language to model the EAP-FAST method. Given the
set of goal facts and goal section that we have deﬁned for our AVISPA model, no attack
is found by the two OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends and the summary results are safe.
This shows that considering our generic threat model, the EAP-FAST method in reality
mitigates against all those potential attacks and threats.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis we have proposed a complete survey (in terms of required features for multicast
content delivery technology) of various EAP methods and chosen the most suitable one. We
discussed that the EAP-FAST best suits the secure IP multicast technology to satisfy the
set of functional and security requirements. We also explained in detail the superiority of
EAP-FAST over other relevant EAP methods. Then, we modeled the method by means of
HLPSL description language and proposed a generic threat model accordingly, to validate
the intended security properties of the EAP-FAST method successfully by AVISPA.
Plans for prospective researchers might be discovering the functionality requirements
of the EAP-FAST in detail and precisely specifying the content of the token to add an
acceptable level of functionality to the main project, multicast content delivery. Also, a
correct implementation of the project is a must in the industry.
The results of this project are published by Parham and Atwood [34] in the 9th annual
conference of Privacy, Security and Trust 2011.
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Appendix A
The HLPSL Source Code
%EAP-FAST
%HLPSL: Mutual Auth. & Key (Tunnel) Establishment
% Server Auth (certificate) is optional
%Once the clients connect to the network, he can have the ’Kar’. So, option of the PAC i
%OR, the client receives a ’Kar’ in his token from the MR.
%Request/Response
%Start EAP-FAST, Establish TLS
%Hello (1)
%Hello (2)
%Certificate (1) =|> Peer Authentication
%Certificate (2) : Optional =|> Server Authentication
%Key exchange (1)
%Key exchange (2)
%Change Cipher (1) , (2)
%Finished
role auth_server (S, P : agent,
H, KeyGen, PRF : hash_func,
% : hash_func,
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Kar, Ks : public_key,
SND_P, RCV_P : channel (dy))
played_by S def=
local Ns, Csus, PMS : text,
SessID : text,
% Ph,
Np, VerNo, Csu, Pcertreq : text,
% Sc, Cke, Cv,
Pkeyexchange, Phellodone, Cciphspec : text,
State : nat,
Finished : hash(hash(text.text.text).agent.agent.text.text.text),
ClientK, ServerK : hash(agent.text.text.hash(text.text.text)),
Kp : public_key,
% Nps : text.text
const sec_clientK,
sec_serverK,
nps1, nps2 : protocol_id,




init State := 0
transition
0. State = 0 /\ RCV_P(request_id) =|>
State’:= 2 /\ SND_P(respond_id.S)
2. State = 2 /\ RCV_P(start_eap_fast) =|>
State’:= 4 /\ Ns’ := new()
/\ Csiphspec’ := new()
/\ VerNo’ := new()
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/\ SND_P( VerNo’.sid0.Ns’.Cciphspec’ ) % server hello (SeID=0)
% including option of the server auth
4. State = 4 /\ RCV_P(
VerNo.SessID’.Np’.Csu’. % peer hello
{P.Kp’}_inv(Kar). % peer certificate
Pkeyexchange’. % peer key exchange
Pcertreq’. % peer certificate request
%Drop, if Ser Auth is not chosen
Phellodone’) % peer hello done
=|>
State’:= 6
/\ PMS’ := new()
/\ Cciphspec’ := new()
/\ Finished’ := H(PRF(PMS’.Ns.Np’).S.P.Ns.Csu’.SessID’)
/\ ServerK’ := KeyGen(S.Ns.Np’.PRF(PMS’.Ns.Np’))
/\ ClientK’ := KeyGen(P_.Ns.Np’.PRF(PMS’.Ns.Np’))
/\ SND_P({S.Ks}_inv(Kar). % server certificate
%Drop, if Ser Auth is not chosen
{PMS’}_Kp’. % server key exchange
{H(Ns.Np’.P.PMS’)}_inv(Ks). % server certificate verify
Cciphspec’. % change cipher spec
{Finished’}_ServerK’) % finished
/\ witness(S,P,nps2,Ns.Np’)
6. State = 6 /\ RCV_P(Ccs.{Finished}_ClientK) =|>






role peer (S, P : agent,
H, KeyGen, PRF : hash_func,
% : hash_func,
Kp, Kar : public_key,
SND_S, RCV_S : channel (dy))
played_by P def=
local Np, SessID : text,
PMS : text,
Ns, Csus, VerNo, Csu, Pke : text,
% Sc, Cke, Cv, Sh,:text,
Ccs, Pcertreq, Phellodone : text,
State : nat,
Finished : hash(hash(text.text.text).agent.agent.text.text.text),
ClientK, ServerK : hash(agent.text.text.hash(text.text.text)),
Ks : public_key
const nps1, nps2 : protocol_id,




init State := 1
transition
1. State = 1 /\ RCV_S(start) =|>
State’:= 3 /\ SND_S(request_id)
3. State = 3 /\ RCV_S(respond_id.S) =|>
State’:= 5 /\ SND_S(start_eap_fast)
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% including option of the server authentication
5. State = 5 /\ RCV_S(VerNo’.sid0.Ns’.Csus’) % server hello
=|>
State’:= 7
/\ Np’ := new()
/\ SessID’ := new()
/\ Phellodone’ := new()
/\ Pcertreq’ := new()
/\ Pke’ := new()
/\ Csu’ := new()
/\ SND_S(VerNo’.SessID’.Np’.Csu’. % peer hello
{P.Kp}_inv(Kar). % peer certificate
Pke’. % peer key exchange
Pcertreq’. % peer certificate request;
%Drop. If Server Auth is not chosen
Phellodone’) % server hello done
/\ witness(P,S,nps1,Ns’.Np’)
% with the option of server auth
7. State = 7
/\ RCV_S({S.Ks’}_inv(Kar). % server certificate;
%Drop, if Server Auth is not chosen
{PMS’}_Kp. % server key exchange
{H(Ns.Np.P.PMS’)}_inv(Ks’). % server certificate verify
Ccs’. % change cipher spec
{Finished’}_ServerK’ % finished
)
/\ Finished’ = H(PRF(PMS’.Ns.Np).S.P.Ns.Csu.SessID)
/\ ServerK’ = KeyGen(S.Ns.Np.PRF(PMS’.Ns.Np))
=|>
State’ := 9






role session(P, S : agent,
Kp, Ks, Kar : public_key,
H, KeyGen : hash_func,
PRF : hash_func)
def=








const p,s : agent,
kp, ks, ki, kar : public_key,
h, keygen : hash_func,
prf : hash_func
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%Peer authenticates Server on nps1
authentication_on nps1
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